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Introduction
In modern times, airplanes, ships, and trucks have all been used to carry goods from one region of the world to another. Representative textbooks in international trade such as Feenstra (2004) and Krugman and Obstfeld (2005) tell us that unrestricted trade between different regions of the world is welfare improving. This notwithstanding, researchers in both the life and the social sciences have increasingly pointed out that the extent of these welfare improvements is likely to be less than what most investigators have hitherto posited. Why? As Parker et al. (1999 ), Batabyal (2004 , and Work et al. (2005) have noted, this is because in addition to carrying goods between regions, airplanes, ships, and trucks have also managed to carry a whole host of non-native plant and animal species (also known as alien or invasive species) from one geographical region of the world to another.
There are many ways in which airplanes, ships, and trucks have transported non-native plant and animal species from one region of the world to another. Non-native animal species have sometimes succeeded in lodging themselves in the landing gear of airplanes and in this way they have traveled as stowaways from one nation to another. Similarly, a number of marine non-native species have been introduced unintentionally into a region by ships dumping their ballast water. Cargo ships commonly carry ballast water in order to augment vessel stability when they are not carrying full loads. When these ships come into a seaport, this ballast water must be released before cargo can be loaded. This means of species introductions is important and very recently the problem of managing alien species that have been introduced into a particular region by means of the dumping of ballast 5 See Yang and Perakis (2004) , , and Batabyal and Beladi (2006) for more on this literature. 4 water has received some attention in the literature. 5 Ships routinely use containers to carry cargo from one nation to another and these containers are often the source for the introduction of one or more non-native species. Such introductions take place because non-native species can remain hidden in containers for long periods of time. In addition, substances such as wood-often used to pack cargo in containers-may themselves contain nonnative species. In fact, as noted by Batabyal and Nijkamp (2005) , a joint report from the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), and the United States Forest Service (USFS) has shown that nearly 51.8% of maritime shipments contain solid wood packing substances and that infection rates for solid wood packing substances are nontrivial (USDA, APHIS, and USFS (2000, p. 25) ). To see this, consider the following case.
Inspections of wooden spools from China revealed infection rates between 22% and 24% and inspections of braces for granite blocks imported into Canada were found to hold live insects 32% of the time (USDA, APHIS, and USFS (2000, pp. 27-28) ).
When non-native species invade new habitats, they give rise to immense costs in the nations in which these novel habitats are located. Here are two illustrations of such costs from the United States. First, the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA (1993)) has established that the Russian wheat aphid caused $600 million worth of crop damage between 1987 and 1989 . Second, Pimentel et al. (2000 have calculated the total costs of all non-native species at around $137 billion per year.
Economic costs are not the end of the story. In fact, in addition to these economic costs, non-native species have caused a lot of ecological damage as well. For example, Vitousek et al. (1996) have noted that non-native species can change ecosystem processes, act as vectors of diseases, and diminish biological diversity. In addition, Cox (1993) has observed that out of 256 vertebrate extinctions with a known cause, 109 are the outcome of the actions of non-native species. Because of these reasons, both economists and ecologists are very interested in the management of non-native species. Now, from the standpoint of a manager, there are a number of actions that this individual can take to address the problem of biological invasions. These actions are typically pre-invasion or postinvasion in nature. The objective of pre-invasion actions is to prevent non-native species from invading a new habitat. In contrast, post-invasion actions involve the optimal control of a non-native species, given that this species has already invaded a new habitat. The nascent economics literature on the management of non-native species has generally focused its attention on the properties of alternate post-invasion actions. For instance, Barbier (2001) has noted that the economic impact of a biological invasion can be discerned by analyzing the nature of the interaction between the native and the alien species. Using an intertemporal management model Eiswerth and Johnson (2002) point out that the optimal level of management effort is responsive to ecological factors that are not only species and site specific but also probabilistic in nature. Olson and Roy (2002) have used a stochastic framework to examine the situations in which it is optimal to wipe out a non-native species and the situations in which it is not optimal to do so. Finally, Eiswerth and van Kooten (2002) have shown that in some cases, it is possible to use information furnished by specialists to create a model in which it is optimal to not eradicate but instead regulate the spread of an alien species.
Inspections are a basic pre-invasion tool that is available to managers interested in precluding biological invasions. They are routinely used at airports, land border crossings, and in seaports to screen humans, the cargo carried by humans, and the cargo carried in containers. As a result, several researchers have now begun to formally study inspections and their properties in the context of nonnative species management. In this regard, McAusland and Costello (2004) , , Beladi (2006), and DeAngelo et al. (2006) have all studied the properties of alternate ways of structuring the inspection function given that inspections are a very useful practical preinvasion management tool. McAusland and Costello (2004) show that when one takes a dynamic view and considers the future effects of current species introductions, one is naturally led to favor more stringent inspections. Batabyal and Beladi (2006) use queuing theory to show how maximization problems for choosing the optimal number of inspectors can be formulated after one undertakes a stationary state analysis of two multi-person inspection regimes. have analyzed and queuing models of inspections and have concluded that there is
a tension between economic cost minimization and inspection stringency in non-native species management. What this means is that greater inspection stringency with a larger number of inspectors leads to higher economic costs and laxer inspection stringency with a smaller number of inspectors results in lower economic costs.
The paper that is most closely related to our paper is the one by DeAngelo et al. (2006) .
Focusing their attention on an arbitrary seaport, these researchers have studied the properties of inspections by utilizing the "average wait of a ship in the port system" or criterion in a AWS M/G/1 queuing model. Their basic result is that there is no necessary tension between economic cost minimization and inspection stringency in non-native species management. In the context of their paper, greater (lesser) inspection stringency reflects an enhanced (decreased) concern for the potential damage from a biological invasion. Therefore, a seaport manager who places a relatively big (small) 6 For more on this point see Ross (2003, p. 477) .
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weight on invasion damage control will, all else being equal, want to inspect ships more (less) stringently.
As we have noted previously, inspections clearly constitute an important part of the general task of pre-invasion non-native species management. Therefore, we use an alternate cost criterion, namely the "average wait of a ship in queue" or criterion to investigate the generality of the AWQ central "no necessary tension" result in DeAngelo et al. (2006) . Note that we're not saying that AWS is a useless measure of costs. On the contrary, it is a perfectly reasonable way to model the economic cost of inspections. Further, we stress that within the context of a queuing model of non-native species management, there are two standard ways of modeling the economic cost imposed on society by inspections.
6 DeAngelo et al. (2006) have used and have hence concentrated on the first of AWS these two ways. Therefore, a natural question to ask is whether the central DeAngelo et al. (2006) result holds when costs are modeled using the second of these two ways. That is what we're doing in this paper by focusing on and this is the sense in which our paper is an extension of the AWQ earlier DeAngelo et al. (2006) paper.
Our theoretical analysis demonstrates that there is an ambiguous answer to this tension question. Hence, we use numerical methods and our numerical analysis leads to two conclusions.
First, for many values of the model parameters that describe the strictness of inspections, there is a tension between cost minimization and inspection stringency. Second, for most values of the model parameter that depicts the volume of maritime trade handled by the seaport under consideration, there is no tension between cost minimization and inspection stringency. Our results in this paper are 7 For additional details on this property see Ross (2003, pp. 272-273). 8 different from the findings in with the and the queuing models.
The general reason for this variance is that the queuing model that we employ in this paper is different from the queuing models used by . More specifically, the random inspection times in the paper are exponentially distributed and the exponential distribution is the unique distribution that has the so called memoryless property. 7 In contrast, in the present paper, the inspection times are generally and not exponentially distributed.
The rest of this paper is arranged as follows. Section 2 provides a primer on queuing theory and then this section describes the queuing theoretic model that we use in this paper. Section 3 first delineates the "average wait of a ship in queue" or criterion that we use in this paper to explore AWQ the generality of the findings obtained by DeAngelo et al. (2006) . Next, this third section conducts a detailed theoretical and numerical analysis of the aforementioned tension question. Section 4 concludes and offers suggestions for future research on the subject of this paper.
Economic Cost Minimization and Inspection Stringency

Queuing theory: a primer
Queuing theory-see Taylor and Karlin (1998) and Ross (2003) for textbook expositions-studies waiting lines or queues from a mathematical perspective. All queuing models have the following three features. First, there is a random arrival process. Second, there is a probabilistic service process. Finally, there is a deterministic number of servers. In the queuing model of this paper, the Poisson process constitutes the arrival process. In this case, the times between successive arrivals are exponentially distributed and the exponential distribution is memoryless.
Therefore, the letter is commonly used to describe the Poisson arrival process.
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Like the interarrival times of the previous paragraph, in general, the service or inspection times are also stochastic. The reader will recall that the main aim of our paper is to investigate the generality of the findings in DeAngelo et al. (2006) . Therefore, like DeAngelo et al. (2006), we also use the letter to denote the general cumulative distribution function of the random inspection times.
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G Finally, the deterministic number of inspectors is generally denoted by some positive integer and in our paper we suppose that this positive integer is one. In the language of queuing theory, the inspection regime that we're analyzing in this paper corresponds to the queuing model. In words, in our M/G/1 model, the arrival process of ships in the seaport is Poisson, the time it takes to inspect a ship is arbitrarily or generally distributed, and there is one representative inspector.
Inspections in alien species management
Consider a stylized seaport in a specific coastal region of some nation that is publically owned.
Ships with ballast water and/or cargo in containers arrive at this seaport to either load or unload cargo.
If they have arrived to load cargo then these ships carry this cargo to a seaport in some other region of the world. The arrival of these ships coincides with the arrival of a whole host of possibly damaging non-native animal and plant species. We suppose that the arrival rate of these animal and plant species is proportional to the arrival rate of the ships and hence we shall not model these species directly.
Instead, we shall concentrate on the ships that bring these species to our seaport by means of either their ballast water or the containers that are used to carry the cargo. The arrival process of the ships in our seaport denotes the arrival process for the queuing theoretic inspection regimes that we analyze in this paper.
Following the discussion in section 2.1, we assume that the ships in question arrive at our seaport in conformity with a Poisson process with rate
The reader should note that, ceteris λ >0.
paribus, a higher indicates two things. First, because the arrival rate of the various non-native animal λ and plant species is proportional to the arrival rate of the ships, a higher means a larger volume of λ possibly deleterious biological organisms and hence a higher chance of a biological invasion. Second, a higher also means that our seaport is now dealing with more cargo or a higher volume of maritime λ trade. This discussion tells us that serves as a proxy for both the likelihood of a biological invasion λ and the volume of maritime trade.
A key objective of our seaport manager is to prevent invasions by the potentially destructive animal and plant species entering the seaport under study. Hence, arriving ships must be inspected before they can either load or unload cargo. We suppose that ships are inspected on a first-come-firstserved basis and one inspector is assigned to each dock in our seaport. In what follows, we shall analyze a representative dock inspector's decision problem. Also, we shall think of the inspection function broadly. What this means is that for some ships, only the ballast water will be inspected. For other ships, only the containers carrying cargo will require inspection. Finally, for a third group of ships, both the ballast water and the containers will be inspected. Therefore, inspections will generally require random amounts of time. To model this explicitly, we allow the inspection times to be 10 There is support in the extant literature for our "lower (higher) variance implies more (less) reliable" interpretation. For additional details on this point see Salvucci et al. (1997) and Yu (2005) .
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arbitrarily distributed. The seaport system under study consists of ships that are being inspected, ships that are waiting to be inspected, the representative dock inspector, and the seaport manager.
It is reasonable to expect that the amount of time it takes to complete inspections has a direct bearing on the stringency of inspections. Hence, to model this idea, we assume that there are two feasible inspection regimes in our seaport. In the first or more stringent inspection regime, the average inspection time is and the variance of this time is In the second or less stringent inspection ν
regime, the mean inspection time is and the variance of this time is
and that These two inequalities together tell us that inspection regime is more
requires that more time be spent on the inspection function. Also, the variability of the time spent inspecting ships in regime is less than the variability of the time spent inspecting ships in regime M L .
As a consequence, the more stringent regime's inspection times have a smaller coefficient of M variation and thus are consistently smaller compared to those of the less stringent regime. L
The reader should note that we are measuring the reliability of the two inspection regimes with the two variance parameters and In other words, the stringent regime is stringent not only
because on average the inspector spends more time inspecting ships but also because, having spent more time, the inspector can be more certain that he has not made either type I or type II errors while discharging his duties. This feeling "more certain" corresponds to greater reliability and this greater reliability, in turn, corresponds to a lower variance. That is why we have 10 Given this τ 
The AWQ criterion
Inspections that lead to the preclusion of a biological invasion by non-native animal or plant species undoubtedly result in benefits to the citizens of the coastal region that we are studying.
However, during the time that arriving ships are being inspected, there is neither loading nor unloading of cargo, and hence, in general, economic activity resulting from maritime trade is at a standstill. This ephemeral stoppage of economic activities imposes costs on the economy of our coastal region. This cost can be measured by computing a specific criterion such as "the average wait of a ship in the port system" or In this way of looking at the problem, the longer (shorter) the average wait in the AWS. port system or the larger (smaller) the costs from the cessation of economic activities.
AWS,
Therefore, a seaport manager who is concerned primarily about the economic costs that are imposed on society by the activities of the representative inspector will want to keep as low as possible. AWS In contrast, a seaport manager who frets more about the possible damage to society from a biological invasion will want to have the more stringent or inspection regime in place. DeAngelo et al. (2006) M have used this criterion in a queuing model and have shown that contrary to the central AWS M/G/1 finding in , there is no universal tension between economic cost minimization and inspection stringency in non-native species management.
As noted in section 1, the criterion is one of two possible criteria that we can use in AWS thinking about the above mentioned economic costs in the context of a queuing model. As such, suppose we adopt a somewhat looser interpretation of these costs and say that the loading and/or the unloading of cargo may proceed on a ship that is presently being inspected for potentially invasive species but that such activities may not take place on ships that have yet to be inspected and are waiting in queue. In this way of looking at the problem, ships in queue are the ones that are most likely to impose economic costs on society. We shall refer to this second-and somewhat looser-economic cost criterion as the "average wait of a ship in queue" or criterion. Given this alternate cost AWQ criterion, a key issue that arises is this: Do the findings contained in DeAngelo et al. (2006) hold when the criterion and not the criterion is used to measure the economic cost of inspections?
AWQ AWS
We now address this question in detail.
Our first order of business is to compute for the two inspection regimes that we AWQ M/G/1 are presently studying. To do this, we shall use equations 1.2 and 3.17 in Taylor and Karlin (1998, p. 544 and p. 563). Using these two equations, our desired expressions for are AWQ
respectively for the two regimes. We can use the inequalities and to show that
However, because may be larger or smaller than simply more stringent inspection regime in the seaport under study, it is not always the case that economic M costs measured by the criterion will be higher. So, in the general case, there may or may not be AWQ a tension between economic cost minimization and inspection stringency. This tells us that even when we use the criterion, the finding in DeAngelo et al. (2006) that there is no necessary tension AWQ between economic cost minimization and inspection stringency holds.
We have just seen that there is no unique resolution of this tension question. To provide additional insight into this issue, in the remainder of this paper, we use a numerical perspective to study this tension question in three different ways. However, before we move to the specifics of the numerical analysis, let us stress three points. First, it is clearly infeasible to work with the infinitely many combinations of the model parameters that are possible. As such, the reader
should understand that the primary point of the subsequent numerical analysis is illustrative. We wish to demonstrate not only the functional dependence of the criterion on the various model AWQ parameters but also the different results that obtain as we vary these parameters. Second, we have conducted numerical analyses of the sort delineated below with many different values of the distinct model parameters. Rather than bore the reader with umpteen graphs of the various possible results, what we are reporting below is a selection of model parameters that generates-to the best of our knowledge-representative results. Finally, the collective lesson from the above two points is that the answer to the central tension question that we are investigating in this paper is seaport specific.
Different seaports are likely to have different values of the arrival rate
Therefore, in a particular λ .
practical situation, a seaport manager will typically want to choose the inspection regime stringency 11 Clearly, is not the only possible objective function for a seaport manager. Depending on the specifics of a particular situation, AWQ a seaport manager may want to minimize costs in addition to those that we are capturing in AWQ.
parameters
to account for the specific value of confronting him as he optimizes a particular (ν,τ) λ objective function such as 11
AWQ.
Let the arrival rate of ships be per unit time. Further, suppose that the parameters of the λ ' 1 two inspection regimes are and Now, employing equation (1)
is straightforward to confirm that and When
two expressions reduce to and
Examining these two expressions for we see that as the arrival rate of ships AWQ M (AWQ L ) λ approaches 2 (2.5), economic costs measured by the criterion approach infinity. This
means that there is an upper limit on the volume of maritime trade that our seaport can handle and when this limit is approached, the economic costs of inspections become immeasurably large. Second, when and are as stated in the previous paragraph, the economic costs of inspections are
lower when the more stringent inspection regime is in place. The reader will note that this is also M a case in which there is no tension between economic cost reduction and inspection stringency.
The tension question in terms of the volume of maritime trade
For the parameter values specified above, we now analyze the dependence of on AWQ λ .
Equating and and then simplifying gives us
The two solutions to equation (2) are and Because must be positive, we conclude λ for all values of our seaport manager will prefer to have the more stringent or λ , 0<λ#1.74, M inspection regime in place because this regime leads to lower economic costs as measured by the criterion. Only when does it make sense for the seaport manager to use the less AWQ λ >1.74 stringent or inspection regime to inspect arriving ships at the seaport under study. Put differently, L when there is no tension between economic cost minimization and biological invasion λ 0 (0,1.74] damage control. In contrast, there is a tension between economic cost minimization and the stringency of inspections when λ >1.74.
The tension question in terms of the mean inspection times
We now numerically investigate the functional dependence of on the means of
the two inspection regimes and in section 3.3 we shall conduct a similar exercise from the standpoint of the two variances As in our earlier numerical analysis, we have and
in order to conduct the subsequent numerical analysis in two dimensions, we suppose that and that In other words, the two means and the two variances are ν
assumed to be linearly related to each other and the parameters and are the two constants of a b
proportionality. From an economic standpoint, we can think of the parameter as a measure of the a difference in the stringencies of the two inspection regimes and Similarly, the parameter can M L. b be thought of as a measure of the difference in the variability-and hence the reliability-of the same two inspection regimes. Now, using the section 3 parameter values, we have and λ
we set equal to its midpoint, i.e.,
Note 
The tension question in terms of the variances of the inspection times
Our final task is to numerically examine the functional dependence of on the variances
of the and the inspection regimes. As in section 3.2, in order to conduct the analysis in two M L dimensions, we have and Further, using the previous
values of the pertinent parameters, we have and we shall set expressions for the economic cost criterion and some reflection tell us that there is no value of for b which our seaport manager is indifferent between the two inspection regimes being studied. we have graphically shown the impact that alternate choices of these two parameters have on the objective function. In addition, this variation exercise also shows that for these two parameters, AWQ inspection stringency, defined in terms of the mean and the variance of the inspection time random variable, lies in the interval and These four conclusions are consistent with the main a0 (1, 4) b0(0,1).
findings obtained by DeAngelo et al. (2006) with the cost criterion and hence we note that the AWS basic findings of DeAngelo et al. (2006) are general in the sense that they hold not only for the AWS cost criterion but also for the cost criterion. AWQ 
Conclusions
Non-native animal and plant species often succeed in invading new habitats as a result of maritime trade in goods by means of ships. Hence, if an appropriate authority such as a seaport manager's goal is to prevent biological invasions, then he must inspect arriving ships for potentially deleterious biological organisms. Given this context, we used the cost criterion in the AWQ M/G/1 queuing model to investigate the generality of the findings obtained recently by DeAngelo et al. (2006) . Our theoretical analysis showed that there is no unique answer to the question as to whether there is or isn't a tension between economic cost minimization and biological invasion damage control.
In addition, our numerical analysis identified particular values of the essential model parameters for which there is a tension between economic cost minimization and biological invasion damage control.
The general outcome of our combined theoretical and numerical analysis is twofold. First, the main findings of DeAngelo et al. (2006) are general in the sense that they hold for the and for the AWS cost criteria. Second, whether or not there is tension between economic cost minimization and AWQ biological invasion damage control depends greatly on the organizational details-the arrival rate of ships and the degree of stringency of inspections-in individual seaports.
The analysis in this paper can be extended in a number of directions. We now suggest one such direction. One issue of interest concerns the analysis of situations in which because of heavy traffic in a particular seaport, ships do not enter this seaport but go instead to some other seaport. From the perspective of the manager of a single seaport, this heavy traffic situation can be analyzed with a 
